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THE SUPREME COURT 2009 TERM OVERVIEW AND
2010 TERM PREVIEW
Erwin Chemerinsky,* JoanBiskupic,** MartinA. Schwartz,
Leon Friedman
I.

and

INTRODUCTION

DEAN CHEMERINSKY: On Monday, June 28, 2010, the
Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law.
This Article is based on presentations given at the Practising Law Institute's ("PLI") Twelfth
Annual Supreme Court Review in New York, New York on August 3, 2010 and the TwentySecond Annual Leon D. Lazer Supreme Court Review in Central Islip, New York on November 5, 2010.
Author of American Original: The Life and Constitutionof Supreme CourtJustice Antonin
Scalia and Sandra Day O'Connor: How the First Woman on the Supreme Court Became Its
Most Influential Justice; Legal affairs correspondent, USA Today. Biskupic was the Supreme Court reporter for The Washington Post (1992-2000) and legal affairs writer for Congressional Quarterly (1989-1992). Biskupic authors several reference books, including
CongressionalQuarterly's two-volume encyclopedia on the Supreme Court (1997, with coauthor Elder Witt). A graduate of Georgetown University Law School, Biskupic is a regular
panelist on PBS's "Washington Week with Gwen Ifill" and NPR's "Diane Rehm Show."
Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New
York; J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York University School of Law. Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2004-2006), Section 1983 Litigation: Federal
Evidence (4th ed. 2007) and Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (2007). He is coauthor of Section 1983 Litigation: Statutory Attorney's Fees (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2011).
Professor Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the New York Law Journal
entitled "Public Interest Law." He is lead author of Section 1983 Litigation, Second Edition
(Federal Judicial Center 2008). He chairs the Practising Law Institute's annual program on
Section 1983 Litigation and Trial Evidence and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court Review.
* Joseph Kushner Distinguished Professor of Civil Liberties Law, Hofstra Law School.
A.B., magna cum laude, 1954, Harvard College; LL.B., cum laude, 1960, Harvard Law
School. Professor Friedman has written briefs for the United States Supreme Court in over
thirty cases dealing with issues of Habeas Corpus, Criminal Procedure, Copyright, Civil
Rights and the First Amendment. Professor Friedman has published over fifteen books and
over 100 articles on various legal subjects. One of his books, The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1789-1969, received the Scribes Award as the outstanding book on a legal subject in 1970, and a second work, The Law of War, received an award as one of outstanding
reference books published in 1973. He is also the co-author of a Broadway play, The Trial
ofLee Harvey Oswald, later made into a television movie.
*
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Supreme Court completed its fifth year with John Roberts as Chief
Justice, its first year with Justice Sonia Sotomayor on the bench, and
its thirty-fifth and final Term with Justice John Paul Stevens.' This
year, the Supreme Court decided seventy-three cases after briefing
and oral argument, 2 just a few less than the seventy-six cases decided
the year before in the 2008 Term. 3 Sixty-seven were orally argued in
the 2007 Term, 4 following seventy-one cases heard in the 2006
Term.s As recently as the 1980s, the Court was averaging 150 cases
6
per year. A decline from 150 to 73 cases in two decades is truly
dramatic and has important implications. Major legal issues will go a
longer time before being resolved. Also, more conflicts among the
circuits and states will go a longer time before being settled.
The Court's smaller docket may be the reason that the average
length of the opinions has increased. This Term may set the record
for the largest average number of pages per opinion. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Citizens United v. FederalElections Commission7
was well over one hundred pages long.' This pales in comparison to
the Court's 208 page opinion in McDonaldv. City of Chicago.9 This
Term, there were fourteen per curiam opinions, decided without
briefing and oral argument.10 These are cases decided just on the ba-

1

Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
2 The Supreme CourtDatabase:2009 Analysis CaseListing, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-TIETACK-7735 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
The Supreme Court Database:2008 Analysis CaseListing, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-FLAPJACK-21 18 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
4 The Supreme Court Database:2007 Analysis Case Listing, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-COLDSPELL-8089 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
5 The Supreme Court Database:2006 Analysis Case Listing, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-FASTBREAK-4542 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
6 The Supreme Court Database: 1900-2000 Analysis Case Listing, SCDB, http://scdb.wu
stl.edu/analysisOverview.php?sid=1002-POTLUCK-9768 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
7 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
8 See id.

9 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
10 See Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010); United States v. Juvenile Male, 130 S. Ct.
2518 (2010); Jefferson v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 2217 (2010); Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct.
1235 (2010); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010); Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171
(2010); McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010); Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721
(2010); Wellons v. Hall, 130 S. Ct. 727 (2010); Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 130 S. Ct. 8
(2009); Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009); Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383
(2009); Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447 (2009); Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546
(2009).
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sis of the certiorari petition and the certiorari opposition. Some of
these were important cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel.'
This is a disturbing trend. When cases are decided based on
the certiorari petition and the opposition to certiorari, the briefing is
different than when the case is decided on the merits. A certiorari petition should convince the Court why it should hear the case, such as
when there is a split among the circuits and when there is an issue of
national importance. The purpose of the opposition to certiorari is for
the party to argue that such a conflict does not exist or that further
percolation would be beneficial.
This Term, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas voted together eighty-eight percent of the time.' 2 Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor voted together ninety percent of
the time.' 3 However, what matters most is that it is the Anthony
Kennedy Court. Out of tradition and deference to the Chief Justice, it
is referred to as the John Roberts Court, but it actually functions in
practice as the Anthony Kennedy Court. The two Justices most often
in the majority this Term were Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Anthony Kennedy.14 These Justices were in the majority over ninety
percent of the time." Justice Kennedy has had the most effect on the
Court with respect to five-four decisions. This Term, there were sixteen five-to-four decisions out of the seventy-three cases.16 Justice
Kennedy was in the majority in eleven of these cases.
The ideology of the Roberts Court can best be seen by focusing on the five-four decisions that were split along traditional ideological lines. This Term provided eleven such cases where Justices
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side, and Justices Stevens,

"1 See, e.g., Sears, 130 S. Ct. 3259; Porter, 130 S. Ct. 447.
12 End of Term StatisticalAnalysis-October Term 2009, SCOTUSBLOG, 5 (July
7, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Summary-Memo-0707 10.pdf.
13 id.

14 Erin Miller, Frequency in the Majority, SCOTUSBLOG, 6 (July 7, 2010), http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-6.pdf.
15 Id.

16 The Supreme Court Database: Analysis Case Listings for 5-4 Decisions, SCDB,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-LEAPFROG-1219 (last visited Jan.
11,2011).
'7 Erin Miller, Five-to-Four Cases, SCOTUSBLOG, 3 (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotus
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-3.pdf.
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Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor were on the other side.' 8 Justice
Kennedy voted with the conservative Justices in eight out of the eleven cases and sided with the liberal Justices in three out of the eleven
cases.' 9 The year before, there were sixteen cases split along traditional ideological lines with Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito on one side, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
on the other side.20 Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives in
eleven out of the sixteen cases and sided with the liberals in five out
of the sixteen cases. 21 Looking at the five years of the Roberts Court,
Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives more than with the liberals almost every Term. 22
However, there were notable cases that did not come out the
2 3 where the Supreme
conservative way, such as Graham v. Florida,
Court ruled that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of
parole is cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile offender.24 In
Lewis v. City of Chicago,2 5 the Supreme Court's unanimous decision
impacted the statutes of limitations in employment cases to favor
plaintiffs.2 6 But, there is no doubt that overall the Roberts Court is a
conservative court.27
Justice Stevens leaving the bench will likely intensify the role
of Anthony Kennedy. When the Chief Justice is in the majority, the
Chief Justice assigns the writing of the opinion to either himself or to
a Justice in the majority. If the Chief Justice is not in the majority,
then the most senior Associate Justice assigns the opinion. Until
now, when Justice Kennedy joined the more liberal Justices in the

19 Id.
20 Akin

Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, End of Term Statistical Analysis-October
Term 2008, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2009), http://scdb.wustl.eduI/analysisCaseListing.php?
sid=1002-LEAPFROG-1219.
21

id.

The Supreme Court Database: Justice Kennedy's Decision Direction, SCDB,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisOverview.php?sid=1002-BACKPACK-6621 (last visited Jan.
11,2011).
23 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
24 Id. at 2030.
2
130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
26 Id. at 2199 (holding that while disparate treatment claims require "deliberate discrimination within the limitations period," claims for disparate impact do not).
27 See Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at Al ([T]he [C]ourt not only moved to the right but also became the
most conservative one in living memory . . . .").
22
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majority, Justice Stevens would decide who wrote the opinion. Now
when Justice Anthony Kennedy is with the liberal Justices, he will be
the most senior Associate Justice and thus will assign the author of
the majority opinion when Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan form the majority.
Finally, what will the confirmation of Elena Kagan, and more
generally the Obama presidency, likely mean for the Supreme Court?
Justice Kagan has never been a judge before joining the Supreme
Court, which is in no way disqualifying. 28 In fact, many former Justices had never been on the bench before being appointed to the Supreme Court, such as Justices Brandeis, Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, Warren, and more recently, Rehnquist and Powell. 29 Since
Justice Kagan has never been on the bench, there exists no body of
prior judicial opinions to scrutinize, unlike when Justice Sotomayor
was confirmed.3 0
As a law professor, Elena Kagan wrote only five major articles, and none of them were particularly controversial.3 1 The disadNaftali Bendavid & Nathan Koppel, The Supreme Court: A Modest Startfor KaganCountering Charges ofActivism, Court Nominee Says She Will Be "Deferential," WALL ST.
28

J., July 29, 2010, at A5.

29 See Louis D. Brandeis, 1916-1939, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL
SOCIETY,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/louis-brandeis1916-1939/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); William 0. Douglas, 1939-1975, THE SUPREME
COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/assoc
iate-justices/william-douglas-1939-1975/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); Felix Frankfurter,
1939-1962, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/
history-of-the-courtlassociate-justices/felix-frankfurter-1939-1962
(last visited Jan. 30,
2011); Robert H. Jackson, 1941-1954, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL

SOCIETY,

http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courtlassociate-justices/robert-jackson1941-1954/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); Earl Warren, 1953-1969, THE SUPREME COURT
SOCIETY,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/chiefHISTORICAL
justices/earl-warren-1953-1969/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); William H. Rehnquist, 19862005, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/hist
ory-of-the-court/chief-justices/william-rehnquist-1986-2005/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
30 Pat Toomey, I Would Vote Against Kagan: She's Willing to Give Government Far Too
Much Power, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 26, 2010, at B-7 (asserting that even though
Justice Sotomayor was "left of center," she had a seventeen-year record as an appellate judge
which in turn showed her respect for the Constitution and legal jurisprudence, yet Kagan
lacks this as she has no judicial tenure).
3 See Dean Elena Kagan, A Celebration of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 233 (2009); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's NondelegationDoctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2001); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996); Elena

Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and PornographyAfter R.A. V., 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 873
(1993); Elena Kagan, When a Speech Code is a Speech Code: The Stanford Policy and the
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vantage that she poses for President Obama is that neither he nor anyone else can know exactly where she falls on the ideological spectrum. Everyone expects that she will be somewhat left of center.3 2
But, will she be in the same place on the ideological continuum as the
Justice she is replacing? Many think Justice Kagan will be considerably more moderate than Justice Stevens.3 3 However, there is no
way to know based on what she has written or what she has said.
The appointment of Justice Kagan was not President Obama's
first choice for the Supreme Court. A year ago, Justice David Souter
retired at a relatively young age for a Justice-sixty-nine years old.34
He was replaced by Justice Sotomayor. After having read hundreds
of Judge Sotomayor's opinions on the Second Circuit, it was expected that in most cases, she would vote the same way as Justice
Souter. 35 This past Term, Justice Sotomayor was as liberal as anybody on the Court, across the board, including in the criminal procedure and criminal justice cases where some thought that she would be
more conservative. 36
It is widely speculated that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
might step down in the next year or two.37 She is seventy-seven
years old, making her the oldest member of the Court.3 8 The media
reported that a year ago Justice Ginsburg was diagnosed with panTheory ofIncidental Restraints,29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 957 (1996).
32 See, e.g., Confirm Elena Kagan; Intellect, Integrity and Tolerance Make Her Eminently

Qualifiedfor the High Court, WASH. POST, July 4, 2010, at A18 (discussing that Kagan's
way of thinking is completely mainstream even though it is "left of center").
3 See David G. Savage, Kagan's Views Concern Liberals: Of Top Candidatesfor the
High Court, She Has the Broadest Opinion on PresidentialPower, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2010, at 12 (stating that some believe Kagan will grant more executive authority than Stevens ever allowed).
34 Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2009-Celebratinga Year of Highs and Lows,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2010, at R10.
3 See, e.g., Mary R. Vasaly et al., Recent Developments in Appellate Advocacy, 45 TORT
TRIAL& INS. PRAC. L.J. 179, 180 (2010).

See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2266 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing that the Court's holding that a suspect waived his right to remain silent due
to his utterance of a few one-word answers during a three-hour interrogation is a total retreat
from the holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Johnson v. United States,
130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (joining the majority's holding that the defendant's prior conviction
did not constitute a violent felony).
3 Kimberly Atkins, Friday Morning Docket: Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Hospitalized,LAW. USA (Sept. 4, 2009), http://lawyersusaonline.com/dcdicta/2009/09/
24/friday-moming-docket-ginsburg-hospitalized/.
3

See id
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creatic cancer.3 9
On the other side of the ideological aisle, Justice John Roberts
turned fifty-five in January 2010.40 Justice Samuel Alito turned sixty
on April 1, 2010,41 and Justice Clarence Thomas has been on the Supreme Court almost nineteen years, but is only sixty-two years old.4 2
Both Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy turned seventy-four in 2010.43 Absent unforeseen circumstances, it does not
seem likely that any of these five Justices-Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, or Alito-will be leaving the bench during President Obama's presidency.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE OCTOBER 2009 TERM

MS. BISKUPIC: The defining decision of the recently completed Supreme Court Term was Citizens United. Even with a total
of seventy-three decisions, this Term came down to this one case.
During the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings for Elena Kagan,
this decision was repeatedly invoked by both Democrats and Republicans.44 It was invoked more than guns, more than abortion, and
more than gay rights.
I will address the importance of that decision in two respects:
how it reveals the influence of Justice Antonin Scalia, my latest book
subject, and how it reveals the direction of the Roberts Court.
The majority opinion was penned by Justice Anthony Kenne45
dy.
However, Citizens United is an example of the groundwork
that Justice Scalia has laid and seen come to fruition in recent years.
In fact, as Justice Stevens read his poignant, sometimes halting, dissenting opinion from the bench that January morning, he noted that
the seeds of the majority opinion had been planted by Justice Scalia
in the 1990 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce46 dissent.4 7 Justice Stevens wrote in his Citizens United dissent, "All of
3 Id.

See Biographiesof CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court, supra note 1.
41 See id.
42 See id.
4 See id.
4 See TRANSCRIPT: The Elena Kagan Hearings-Day1, WASH. POST, July 28, 2010.
45 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
46 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
47 See id. at 680, 687-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing that the regulation of the polit40
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the majority's theoretical arguments turn on a proposition with undeniable surface appeal but little grounding in evidence or experience,
'that there is no such thing as too much speech.' ,48 Justice Stevens
went on to say, "In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average listener's exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens'
willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process."4 9
Of the supposed value of plentiful speech, Justice Stevens then said
in a footnote, "Of course, no presiding person in a courtroom, legislature, classroom, polling place, or family dinner would take this
hyperbole literally."so
Justice Scalia, who cut his teeth in Washington during the
Nixon and Ford Administrations and post-Watergate era, developed
an antagonism towards Congress and the kind of legislation that was
at the heart of the Citizens United case.5 1 As Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, he was constantly testifying
on behalf of executive privilege and against the disclosure of White
House documents.5 2 He sparred repeatedly with people who are very
familiar to this audience today, such as Sen. Edmund Muskie of
Maine, U.S. Rep. Otis Pike of New York, and U.S. Rep. Father Robert Drinan of Massachusetts. 53 All of them were "Democrats [in
this era] trying to pry information [out ofj the [E]xecutive." 54
ical speech of corporations, for the purpose of not distorting the political process, premised
on the fact that they receive "special advantages" from the government in the form of federal
funding is unconstitutional because it does not serve a compelling state interest served by
narrowly tailored means).
48 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at
695 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
49 Id. at 975-76.
50 Id at 976 n.74.
51 See, e.g., Neal Devins, Commentary: Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on
the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 440 (2001) (discussing how Justice
Scalia "took aim at Congress" by continuously asserting that Congress had abdicated its duty
to be " 'faithful to the Constitution' " (quoting Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32
NAT'L J. 1810, 1811 (2000))).
52 See, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of
Motivation and Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1127, 1140 (1999) ("Now-Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who was then serving as the Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel, had the unenviable task of defending executive privilege before a
Senate subcommittee considering the legislation.").
5 See Joan Biskupic, Citizens United v. FEC: The Roles ofJustices Scalia and Stevens,
COURT BEAT (Jan. 24, 2010), http://www.joanbiskupic.com/blog/?p=76.

54

id
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Justice Scalia's experiences in the 1970s led him to value executive power and to consider Congress as an adversary." This
theme has been prevalent throughout Justice Scalia's tenure, emerging not only in his written concurrence in Citizens United,56 yet even
earlier during the oral arguments in Citizens United when he challenged then-United States Solicitor General Elena Kagan as to Congress's motives. He said to her at one point, "Congress has a selfinterest. . . . [W]e are suspicious of congressional action in the First
Amendment area precisely because we . . . doubt that one can expect

a body of incumbents to draw election restrictions that do not favor
incumbents. Now is that excessively cynical of me? I don't think
SO957

Justice Scalia's political savvy, natural combativeness, and allegiance to the Executive were ideally suited to the post-Watergate
time. Then in the early 1980s, he rode the conservative revolution
identified with Ronald Reagan. He was first appointed to the federal
bench in 1982, on the powerful U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.ss President Reagan elevated him to the Supreme Court in 1986, and after years of being known for his passionate dissents, 59 he has now become a major voice in American law.
It is hard to believe that Justice Scalia, the dissenter and notable contrarian, would now be with the majority on so many important Supreme Court opinions.60 That had happened through the force of his
personality, sense of mission, and the play of judicial appointment
politics. He has been joined in recent years by similarly committed
Justices on the right, most recently Samuel Alito, named by President
George W. Bush in 2006.61
5 JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCAIA 44 (2009).
5 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[I]f speech can be prohibited because, in the view of the Government, it leads to 'moral decay' or does not serve
'public ends,' then there is no limit to the Government's censorship power.").
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50-51, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08205).
See Biographiesof CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court,supra note 1.
s9 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60 See Miller, Frequencyin the Majority, supra note 14 (illustrating that Justice Scalia was
in the majority in seventy-five cases last Term and only Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Roberts were in the majority in a greater number of cases).
61 See Biographiesof CurrentJustices ofthe Supreme Court,supra note 1.
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Another case demonstrating Scalia's influence, beyond Citizens United, is Justice Scalia's 2008 decision in Districtof Columbia
v. Heller,62 finding for the first time an individual right to firearms in
the Second Amendment of the Constitution.6 3 Joining him in that
majority were new Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, along
with Justices Kennedy and Thomas. In the recently completed Term,
Justice Scalia's decision in Heller was reinforced in McDonald v.
City of Chicago," as the Justices extended the Second Amendment
protection to allow gun owners to challenge city and state regulations.6 5
The Roberts Court, as a whole, is not likely to go as far as
Justice Scalia wants on some social issues, for example, to forbid all
race-based policies or to overturn the right of abortion.6 6 But his
views are clearly prevailing on campaign finance regulation, the
Second Amendment, and other hot-button issues. Elena Kagan, who
will soon join the Court, called Scalia "the [Jlustice who has had the
most important impact over the years on how we think and talk about
law." 67 He has arrived at the apex of his power and is strongly defining the Roberts Court today.
Now, I'd like to turn to Chief Justice Roberts, who has been
in the center chair now for five years. 68 Beyond the shift to the right
evident in the Citizens United and two Second Amendment cases, the
conservative majority's imprint has been deepest in areas of social

128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2799 ("There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.").
6 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (posing the issue of whether the Second Amendment is
incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
65 Id. at 3050 (holding "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller").
66 See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("In my view government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction."); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 404 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the issue of a woman's
right to have an abortion is "whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States [and] I am sure it is not").
67 Ann Gerhart & Philip Rucker, Kagan Has Many Achievements, but Her World Has
62
63

Been Relatively Narrow, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (June 10, 2010), http://www.washington

post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/09/AR2010060906240.html.
68 See Biographiesof CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court,supra note 1.
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conservatism-such as on race,6 9 religion,7 0 and abortion rights.7 '
These are all areas of law identified with the social conservatism of
Ronald Reagan.72
In fact, after he was sworn in, Chief Justice Roberts's first
major public appearance was at the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library and Center for Public Affairs in California. 73 There, he identified himself as a Reagan acolyte who had heard the call during the
President's first inaugural speech in 1981.74 The Chief Justice said:
"I felt he was speaking to me" and explained how he then took a job
in the Justice Department of the new Reagan administration.
A few months after Roberts's California speech, he struck a
more reserved tone and stressed in a commencement address at
Georgetown University law school the importance of deciding cases
narrowly, and with strong consensus, to build public confidence.7 6
This echoed some of his comments to the Senate Judiciary Committee in his 2005 confirmation hearings.7 7 During those confirmation
hearings, the Chief Justice suggested he would avoid reversing
precedent because of the "jolt to the system."7 8 Chief Justice Roberts, however, wrote in Citizens United that in some cases "the
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48
(2007) (holding that school districts cannot aim for racial balances when there is no history
of segregation in the school district).
70 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 608-09 (2007) (holding that
the case fell outside the Flast exception, and thus taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the funding as a violation of the Establishment Clause).
71 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (holding that a statute prohibiting
dilation and evacuation abortions was constitutionally valid).
72 Joan Biskupic, Court Ends Term With a Right Jab, WASH. POST, June 30, 1993, at Al.
n See Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Address at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Mar. 9, 2006), availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=52
54011&ps-rs (transcript).
74 See id
7 Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan: In Rulings FavoringBusiness and Curbing Race Programsand Abortion, Some See an Overdue Correction; Others
Say the Justices are Taking Nation "Backwards", USA TODAY, June 28, 2007, at 8A.
76 Chief Justice John Roberts, 2006 Georgetown University Law School Commencement
Address (May 21, 2006), availableat http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcastleventDetail.
cfm?eventlD=144.
7 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice ofthe United States, GPO ACCESS (Sept. 12-15, 2005), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cong
ress/senate/judiciary/shl 09-158/browse.html.
78 Id at 144 ("I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent.
Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and evenhandedness.").
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precedent's validity is so hotly contested that it cannot reliably function as a basis for decision in future cases."7 9 Pennsylvania Democratic Senator Arlen Specter said that Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Citizens United was "a . .. repudiation of everything

he testified to" in his confirmation hearings in 2005.so
Along with the elimination of campaign finance rules, Chief
Justice Roberts's most aggressive moves have undercut precedent in
other areas allowing government to consider an individual's race.8 '
In his 2007 opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School DistrictNo. 1,82 Chief Justice Roberts said that "The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." 83
In the area of religion, Chief Justice Roberts has also made
conservative strides. The Rehnquist Court, his predecessor Court,
certainly allowed more religion in public life than prior Courts, for
example, by upholding publicly-financed vouchers for religious
schools. 84 The Roberts Court has moved further in that direction. In
the recently completed Term, Roberts and the four other conservatives invoked a legal rationale in a dispute over a cross on federal
land in the Mojave National Preserve that would strengthen the government's hand to allow religious symbols on public grounds.
Three years earlier, the same conservative majority made it more difficult for taxpayers to challenge government programs that aid religious schools.
Justices Breyer and Stevens have been most vocal in criticizing the conservative majority through the years. 87 In the recently
7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 921 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
so Audio Recording ofJustice DepartmentNominations Hearing, C-SPAN (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/283954-1.
8 See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 747-48 (striking down a school assignment
plan based on race).
82 404 U.S. 833.
8

Id. at 748.

See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (holding that an Ohio school
voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution).
85 See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010) (holding that the Latin cross in the
84

desert represented more than religious beliefs-it also represented the heroic acts of those
who have defended our country's freedom).
86 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 608-09.
87 Joan Biskupic, Breyer Argues for 'Good Faith' on High Court Rulings, USA TODAY,
Dec. 1, 2010, at 6A; Joan Biskupic, Stevens Sure Justices Will Do a Good Job 'In the Long
Run', USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 2010, at 5A.
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completed Term, Justice Breyer took the rare step of announcing his
dissenting opinions for the minority in three cases in protest of where
the conservatives were going. Justice Breyer dissented from the
bench in Holder v. HumanitarianLaw Project,88 McDonald,8 9 and
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.90
Justice Stevens has recently talked about how conservative
the bench has been during his nearly thirty-five year tenure and expressed that " 'The makeup of the [C]ourt has changed dramatically.' "'91 Justice Stevens, who Republican President Gerald Ford appointed in 1975, objects to the common, widespread use of the term
"conservative." 9 2 He said, " 'If you use the term 'conservative' the
way a lot of people use it,

. .

. every new appointee has been more

conservative than his or her predecessor. You can go right down the
line.' "93 Without addressing Justice Sotomayor, Justice Stevens said
the possible exception would be Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who succeeded Justice Byron White in 1993.94
Stevens also made the strong point that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, on which he earlier served, would not have pushed as
far on racial policies or on the Second Amendment.9 5 Both those earlier Courts had effectively endorsed what had been the prevailing notion in previous decades: that the Second Amendment covered only a
state militia right to bear arms, such as for the National Guard, rather

" 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree with the Court's
conclusion that the Constitution permits the Government to prosecute the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations' lawful political objectives.").
89 130 S. Ct. at 3122-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view, taking Heller as a given, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms for purposes of private self-defense.").
90 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view the Court's decision
is wrong-very wrong.").
9 Joan Biskupic, Justice Stevens Keeps Cards Close to Robe in Supreme Court, USA
TODAY, Oct. 19, 2009, at Al (quoting Justice Stevens).
92 See id. (quoting Justice Stevens defining a conservative as one who " 'decid[es] cases
narrowly and pay[s] attention to (precedent),' " as opposed to labeling a Justice on the basis
of political outcomes).
93 id.
94id

9 Joan Biskupic, Stevens Sure Justices Will Do a Good Job 'In the Long Run', supra note
87.
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than an individual right to own guns. 96 Chief Justice Warren Burger,
himself, talked about how the Second Amendment did not cover an
individual right, and that the National Rifle Association (NRA) has
perpetrated this fraud-a word that Chief Justice Burger used to refer
to the interpretation of the Second Amendment providing an individual right to bear arms.97 In so many different areas, one can see how
this Court is far more to the right than the Courts that Justice Stevens
had been part of in his more than three decades on the Court.
It is also of great significance that Chief Justice Roberts is
presiding in a politically polarized era and has generated tensions
with Democratic President Barack Obama. 98 This kind of dynamic
has not been seen in many decades. When President Obama criticized the Court's decision in Citizens United in the State of the Union
Address, the Chief Justice and some of his fellow Justices were livid. 99 In a speech a few weeks later at the University of Alabama, he
derisively deemed the State of the Union atmosphere a " 'political
pep rally.' "1oo Separately at his appearance in Tuscaloosa, Chief
Justice Roberts referred to the fact that members of Congress often
come across the street to hear oral arguments, and added: "We always
welcome these visitors to our home with courtesy and respect," as if
the Justices had not been welcomed at the Capitol during the State of
the Union address.' 0 '
The full weight of the encounter between President Obama
and the Justices at the State of the Union is hard to assess at this
point, as is how the Roberts Court will ultimately rule on new and
significant legal battles heading toward it tied to the Administration's
96 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (stating in a footnote of the
Burger Court opinion that "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have 'some reasonable relationship to the preservation of efficiency of
a well[-]regulated militia' " (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))).
97 Joan Biskupic, Balancing the Belief Reality of the Second Amendment, WASH. PosT,
May 13, 1995, at A7.
98 Joan Biskupic, Judicial-politicalFriction Causes Sparks to Fly: Supreme Court Observers See Rise in Tension between Justice,Elected Leaders, USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 2011, at
A4.
9 Id. (noting that Justice Alito responded to President Obama's denouncement of the
Court's Citizens Unitedruling by mouthing, " '[N]ot true' ").
'"

Id

101 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Address at The University of Alabama School of

Law Albritton Lecture (Mar. 9, 2010), availableat http://www.law.ua.edu/resources/
roberts 10/.
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policies, such as the health care overhaul. The power of the Roberts
Court will depend, in part, on the power of President Obama. If the
President is elected to a second term, the current composition of the
Court will likely be as good as Chief Justice Roberts will have in
terms of conservative Justices. But if a Republican President comes
into office in 2012, the already significant legacy of John Roberts, the
youngest Chief Justice appointed in 200 years, could be monumental.
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: In some of the Court's important decisions this past Term, there existed more humaneness than we
have seen in past recent Terms. For example, a sentence of lifeimprisonment for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses was
overturned.102 Other examples include the concern the Court expressed about criminal defendants knowing about deportation consequences, 0 3 and the more realistic view of the limitation period for
discrimination cases.1 04 Another case exemplifying the Court's humaneness was Florida v. Holland,'os where the defendant's lawyer in
a death penalty case made a mistake regarding the limitations period
for filing a habeas petition.1 06 In past Terms, even before the Roberts
Court, the Court has said that it is just too bad; that is, the lawyer's
sins are visited upon the client.0 7 There seemed to be more of a concern in some of the cases last Term for the plight of the individual.
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: Sometimes, it is hard to discern
whether new trends in the Court are caused by changes in the composition of the Court or changes within the Justices themselves. In the
102 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (holding that a life-sentence for non-homicide crimes
for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment).
103 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482, 1486 (2010) (holding
that the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution requires counsel to inform criminal defendants
of the possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea).
I0
See Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199 (holding that because disparate-impact claims do not require discriminatory intent, they are not bound by the strict time limitations associated with
disparate treatment claims which do require discriminatory intent).
10

130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).

Id. at 2564-65 (holding that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA"), which bars untimely filings for habeas corpus, attorney professional misconduct may be considered "extraordinary" circumstances, thus warranting an equitable tolling of the time limitation).
107 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007) (holding that an attorney
miscalculation does not warrant equitable tolling because this would essentially allow equitable tolling in every case of attorney error, and post-conviction prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel).
'0o
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1979 Term, Justice Rehnquist dissented in thirty percent of the casIn the Court's 2004 Term, his last year, he dissented in only
es.'
seventeen percent of the cases.'0 o Suddenly, the more conservative
Justices are dissenting a lot less often."o What happened? Did the
Justices change or did the Court change? It is pretty obvious that
they themselves did not change. It is really the shift in the composition of the Court.
The Rehnquist Court held federal laws unconstitutional in
thirty-two cases."' The Warren Court held federal laws unconstitutional in twenty-two cases.' 12 When state laws are declared unconstitutional, it can be due to a violation of the Commerce Clause,
preemption, or many other mundane reasons. 13 When a federal law
108 In 1979, there were 156 opinions and of those opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-

sented in forty-seven. See The Supreme Court Database: 1900-2000 Analysis Case Listing,
supra note 6; The Supreme Court Database:Rehnquist's Dissents in the 1979 Term, SCDB,
http://scdb.wustl.edulanalysisOverviewlssues.php?sid=1002-SLIPKNOT-3838 (last visited
Jan. 12, 2011).
10 In 2001, there were eighty opinions and of those opinions, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in fourteen. See The Supreme Court Database:2004 Analysis Case Listing, SCDB,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-FASTPITCH-6662 (last visited Jan.
12, 2011); The Supreme Court Database: Rehnquist's Dissents in 2004, SCDB,
http://scdb.wustl.edulanalysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-TIETACK-4613 (last visited Jan.
12, 2011).
110See Marcia Coyle, Man in the Middle: Justice Kennedy Continues His Role as Pivotal
Vote on a Divided Court, 29 NAT'L L.J. 48 (2008) (stating that Justice Kennedy in the 200607 Term cast the least dissenting votes of all Justices, while in the 2007-08 Term, Justice
Kennedy cast nine dissenting votes, with Chief Justice Roberts casting the least dissenting
votes with seven and Justice Thomas casting the most dissenting votes of all justices with
seventeen).
1" The Supreme Court Database:1986-2004 Cases DeclaringFederalLaws Unconstitutional, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-SLIPKNOT-8165
(last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
112The Supreme Court Database: 1953-1969 Cases DeclaringFederalLaws Unconstitutional, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-LONGJOHN-9681
(last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
" See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (stating that state
law which "conflicts with federal law is 'without effect,' " and "[iun the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law" (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981))); Supreme Court of Va.
v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988) (holding that the residency requirement enforced by the
Virginia Bar as a prerequisite to admission violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, § 2, cl. 1, because it denied non-state citizens a fundamental activity without it
being closely related to advancing an important state interest); Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 265, 274-75 (1984) (holding that the Twenty-First Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not place liquor outside of the control of the Commerce Clause, and
the Twenty-First Amendment is read in concert with Commerce Clause principles); City of
Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620-21, 628-29 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey law
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is declared unconstitutional, it must be because that law violated the
Constitution.114 The Roberts Court has declared federal laws unconstitutional in only six cases in five years."' The rate is a lot lower
than past Courts and that includes Citizens United, where the Court
found bipartisan campaign laws unconstitutional."16
For at least three of the decisions that the Supreme Court decided this year, there have been bills introduced to overrule them." 7
One was in response to Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank, Ltd., 118
which addressed the issue of whether a lawsuit can be brought in an
American court for a violation that occurred abroad." 9 There was also United States v. Stevens,120 the "[c]rush videos" case.121 In Stevens, Congress introduced a law focused on "crush videos," which
feature the intentional torture of animals.122 Many of these videos
"depict women slowly crushing animals to death 'with their bare feet
or while wearing high heeled shoes,' " appealing to a particular sexual fetish.123 The third case, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NationalLa24 involved the structure of delegation by the
bor Relations Board,1
National Labor Relations Board, in which the Supreme Court found
prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste originating outside of the state violated
the Commerce Clause).
114 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (holding that "a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument").
" The Supreme Court Database:2005-2009 Cases DeclaringFederal Laws Unconstitutional, SCDB, http://scdb.wustl.edulanalysisCaseListing.php?sid=1002-HOTSPOT-1374
(last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
"' Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (holding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, which barred corporations from using general treasury funds to make expenditures
for campaign communications thirty days prior to an election, was an unconstitutional violation of the corporation's right to political voice guaranteed under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution).
11 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (effectively overturning Morrison v. National Australian
Bank, Ltd.).
"' 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
"9 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
120

130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).

121 Id. at 1583.
122

id.

Id. at 1583, 1588, 1592 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106-397, at 2 (1999)) (holding that 18
U.S.C. § 48, criminalizing commercial creation, possession, and sale of depictions of animal
cruelty was constitutionally overbroad and violated the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution).
124 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
123
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that two members were not enough.12 5 In the 1991 Term, Congress
overruled five of the Title VII cases, 126 and apparently they are seeking to do the same today.
III.

LOOKING AHEAD: PREVIEW OF THE 2010 TERM

DEAN CHEMERINSKY: When the Court comes back in October, for the first time in history, on the bench there will be three
women, two Justices of color, and not a single veteran of World War
11.127 The lack of geographic diversity on the bench is also notable.128 James Barron, who covers the Supreme Court for the New
York Times, said "Only Staten Island . . . would be without a

[J]ustice to call its own if the Senate confirms Ms. Kagan."l 29 Only
Justice Kennedy came from west of the Mississippi at the time of his
appointment, and only he and Justice Breyer have any experience really growing up or being part of the United States west of the Mississippi.1o Justice Kagan, like her most recent colleague Justice Sotomayor, hails from New York."'
There is also a lack of diversity in terms of the academic
background of the Justices, and this is quite striking. Elena Kagan

Id. at 2639-40 (holding that NLRB's delegation of powers to a three-member committee, pursuant to its delegation clauses, did not allow a committee to regulate with only two
members).
126 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (overruling
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
127 See Biographiesof CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court,supra note 1.
128 See id. (noting that Chief Justice Roberts is from Buffalo, New York;
Justice Scalia is
from Trenton, New Jersey; Justice Kennedy is from Sacramento, California; Justice Thomas
is from Georgia; Justice Ginsburg is from Brooklyn, New York; Justice Breyer is from San
Francisco, California; Justice Alito is from Trenton, New Jersey; Sotomayor is from Bronx,
New York; Justice Kagan is from New York, New York).
129James Barron, A Conservative Bloc, a Liberal Bloc and Now, a New York Bloc, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2010, at Al.
If the nomination of Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court is confirmed,
she would join three others in a distinct bloc. For the first time in the
(C]ourt's history, said William Treanor, the dean of Fordham Law
School, it would have four [J]ustices who grew up in New York City.
Id.
13oSee Biographies of CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court, supra note 1.
125

131 See id.
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went to Princeton and then to Harvard Law School. 132 Sonia Sotomayor went to Princeton and then to Yale Law School. 133 Samuel
Alito went to Princeton and then to Yale Law School. 14 John Roberts went to Harvard and then to Harvard Law School.'
Finally, in terms of demographics, there is a lack of background as trial lawyers among these nine Justices. 136 Elena Kagan's
first argument in any court was when she argued Citizens United in
Only Justice Sotomayor of
the Supreme Court last September."
these nine Justices had ever been a trial lawyer or trial judge for a
significant period of time. 13 8 This could have the potential of creating a very negative consequence by leading to decisions that are not
realistic in terms of what trial lawyers have to deal with on a day-today basis or what trial judges confront.
One of the cases on the Court's 2010 docket is Arizona Christian Schools v. Winn.139 This case involves an Arizona law that allows individuals to receive to a $500 tax credit for money that is then
directed to private schools.140 Individuals may provide the money to
the school tuition organization ("STO") of their choice, 14 1 which in
turn can limit the availability of the scholarship money to specific
schools as long as it is more than one school.142 Many STOs, including the three largest, restrict their scholarship money to Catholic
schools or Evangelical Christian schools.14 3 The Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had standing to challenge the law as a

132

See id

'3 See id.
134 See US Supreme Court: Justice Alito, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH.
LEGAL INFO. INST.,

http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/alito.bio.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
135 See Biographiesof CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court,supra note 1.
136

See id

See Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_08_205 (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
138 See Joe Stephens & Del Quentin Wilber, Sotomayor Shaped
by Stint as Prosecutor,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2009 ("The five years Sotomayor spent in the Manhattan district attorney's office ... shaped her as a criminal prosecutor and helped form her worldview as a
judge. The experience, combined with her later years as a trial judge, would make her
unique among her new colleagues at the Supreme Court. . . .").
13 130 S. Ct. 3350 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
140 Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 562 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
141 id.
142 Id. at 1006.
143 id.
1
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violation of the Establishment Clause.'"
There are two issues the Supreme Court will be confronting in
Winn. The first issue is whether taxpayers have standing to bring this
challenge as violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.145 In Flast v. Cohen,146 decided in 1969, the Supreme Court
said that taxpayers generally do not have standing, but may when
challenging government expenditures violating the Establishment
Clause in particular.147 In the years since, the Court has cut back on
Flast,148 and some Justices have urged it to be expressly overruled.149
Therefore, the underlying issue is whether Flast will survive. If the
Court finds that the taxpayers do have standing, the second issue is
whether the program violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 50
One thing that is particularly interesting about this case is that
the Obama administration wrote a brief arguing that taxpayers do not
have standing, and if the Supreme Court reaches the merits, it should
uphold the program as constitutional.15 ' This position, of urging the
Court to restrict standing to avoid the possibility of programs being
held in violation of the Establishment Clause, is actually the position
taken by Republicans. Democrats, on the other hand, have urged a
continued wall separating church and state and would therefore want
standing to exist. It will be interesting to see how this shift with regard to the Establishment Clause may influence the Court's decision
and whether this case will be the vehicle through which the law is
changed.
Another case to be argued in front of the Supreme Court for

Id at 1011.
Brief for Respondents, Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., Nos. 09-987, 09-991
(petition for cert. granted May 24, 2010).
'4

45

'46

392 U.S. 83 (1968).

147

Id. at 105-06 ("[T]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does specifically

iimit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I § 8.... [W]henever such specific
limitations are found, . . . a taxpayer will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in assuring that
they are not breached by Congress.").
148 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982) (limiting the Flast holding to claims challenging congressional action only, as opposed to actions of administrative agencies).
149 See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Flast should be overruled.").
ISO Brief for Respondents, supra note 145.
1'
Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6, Winn v. Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org., Nos. 09-987, 09-991 (petition for cert. granted May 24, 2010).
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the 2010 Term is Snyder v. Phelps.'5 2 This case deals with the right
to protest at a funeral of a prior member of the military.' 53 The
members of the Westboro Baptist Church, led by Fred Phelps, attend
military funerals to express anti-gay and anti-lesbian messages.' 54
They do not directly seek the funerals of those who were homosexual, but instead use the military funerals as the place for expressing
their anti-gay and anti-lesbian messages."'
Matthew Snyder was a Marine who died in Iraq.'5 6 The
members of the Westboro Baptist Church went to his funeral and
held up signs stating, "God [h]ates the USA," to represent their belief
that a soldier's death was God's punishment for America tolerating
homosexuality.' 57 Matthew Snyder's father, Alvin Snyder, did not
see the signs, but saw a news story that showed footage of them."5
He sued on several causes of action, including intentional infliction
of emotional distress.' 5 9 The jury awarded a large judgment in the
district court, which the Judge remitted to $5 million.160 The Fourth
Circuit reversed and held that the signs were lawful speech.161
This case is extremely difficult because it symbolizes the tension between freedom of speech and privacy. Even if the Supreme
Court holds that there is no liability, there may still be other options
available to state and local governments to use to protect privacy sensibility at funerals. The core principal of the First Amendment is that
speech cannot be punished or be the basis for liability merely because
it is offensive,162 and here, the Court may find that this speech was
offensive and nothing more. However, it is likely that the Court will
allow state governments to create buffer zones around cemeteries and
funeral homes, similar to the buffer zones previously allowed around
reproductive health facilities to keep demonstrators away.
152

130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).

153 Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder II), 580 F.3d 206, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2009), aff'd 130 S. Ct.

1737 (2011).
154 Id. at 211.
1ss Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder: Frequently Asked Questions & Answers, MATTHEw
SNYDER, http://www.matthewsnyder.org/FAQ.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
156 Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 211.
157 Id. at 211-12.
ss Id. at 212.
159 Id. at 211.

160 Snyder v. Phelps (Snyder 1), 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 597 (D. Md. 2008).
161 Snyder II, 580 F.3d at 226.
162

Id. at 214.
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Another case to be argued before the Court this Term is
Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n.163 The case involves a California law that makes it a crime to sell or rent violent
video games to minors under eighteen.'6" Interestingly, many states
have adopted such laws, and every court that has ruled on such a law
has declared it unconstitutional.' 6 ' The Supreme Court granted review in this case even though there was no split among the circuits or
states. 166
The Supreme Court may find the law to be unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad due to the difficulty of defining the word "violence." The law applies to games that "[e]nable[] the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human beings or characters with substantially human characteristics." 67 Even Super Mario
Brothers might be regarded as a violent video game under this standard because the characters are human-like images and a lot of violence befalls them as rocks and other objects land on them.168
In looking at the cases the Court has granted review, which
involve federalism concerns, one distinction that becomes clear is
that this is a Court that is much more willing to find express preemption than implied preemption.169
For example, just a few years ago, the Court decided Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc. 70 The case involved a balloon catheter that was used
in an angioplasty procedure. 17 ' It exploded when it was inserted in

163 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).

16

Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009).

6 See, e.g., Entm't Merchs. Ass'n v. Henry, No. CIV-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097, at

*7, *9 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding that a state law stating that any " 'description,
exhibition, presentation or representation, in whatever form, of inappropriate violence' " is
harmful to minors is unconstitutionally vague); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F.
Supp. 2d 646, 648, 656 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that a state law criminalizing dissemination to minors of" 'ultra-violent explicit video games[s]' " was unconstitutionally vague).
'" See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n
v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
167 Video Software DealersAss'n, 556 F.3d at 954.
168 Brief for Respondents at 58, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, No. 08-1448
(petition for cert. granted Apr. 26, 2010).
169 Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal Preemption at the Supreme Court, 2008
CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257, 264 (2008).
170 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
17' Id. at 320.

2011]

SUPREME COURT OVER VIEWAND PREVIEW

55

Charles Riegel's body.17 2 He had to have emergency open heart surgery and was left with severe permanent injuries.'
The device had
been approved by the FDA under the Federal Medical Devices
Act.174 Before his death in 2004, Charles Riegel brought a tort suit
against the manufacturer.175 The Medical Devices Act preempts state
requirements that are "different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable. . . to the device" under federal law.' 7 6 The question
the Court faced was whether the federal statute preempted tort liability. 177 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and said that tort
liability, unlike other restrictions that only incidentally relate to the
device, is a direct regulation and therefore is preempted. 7 1
The next year in 2009, the Court decided Wyeth v. Levine.179
This involved a woman who was injected with the drug, Phenergan,
for nausea.8 0 After it was injected through the IV-push method, she
developed gangrene in her forearm and it had to be amputated.' 8'
The lawsuit was brought against the drug company for failing to warn
physicians and patients of the higher risk of gangrene when administered through the IV-push method compared to the IV-drip method.182 The Supreme Court faced the question of whether the FDA's
approval of the warning labels preempted state tort liability on a failure to warn claim.183 The Supreme Court ruled six to three against
preemption and said the tort suit could go forward.184
Both cases arose in the health context. Yet, there was
preemption in one and not in the other. One possible explanation for
this is that the former was express preemption, and the latter was implied preemption.
This will be important to keep in mind as the Court hears

172

id.

173 id.
174id

' Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320.
176 Medical Devices Act, 21 U.S.C.A.

n Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315.
n7 Id. at 328-29.
179 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
'8s Id. at 1191.
'8' Id. at 1191-92.
183 Id. at 1191.
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Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204.
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Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.'8 The case involves an Arizona
law that prohibits employers from employing undocumented immigrants.' 8 6 If an employer violates the law, the business can lose its
business license.18 7 The issue the Court must decide is whether the
Arizona law is preempted by federal law.' 8 8 Here, there is an express
preemption provision that restricts states from punishing businesses
that employ undocumented immigrants, except through licensing.189
Another case on the 2010 docket is Bond v. United States.190
According to the facts of the case, Ms. Bond became very excited
when she discovered that her best friend was pregnant, but then later
learned that her husband was the father of her friend's baby."' She
set out to poison and kill her best friend by looking for chemical substances which could be absorbed through the skin. 192 Bond was successfully prosecuted and convicted under two federal statutes.19 3 One
of the statutes involved prohibiting the use of such chemical
agents. 194 Bond argued that this statute violated the Tenth Amendment because it usurps state power.' 9 5 The precise issue before the
Supreme Court is whether an individual criminal defendant can raise
a states' rights argument claiming the state's prerogatives under the
Tenth Amendment are violated.19 6
Another case on the 2010 docket is Flores-Villar v. United
States.197 Flores-Villar involves a federal law that states that a person who was born outside of the United States and has one parent
who is an American citizen is eligible for citizenship if that parent
spent a certain amount of time in the United States in the period pre-

.8s130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
186 Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2009).
187 Id

188 Brief for Respondents, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115 (petition for

cert. granted June 28, 2010).
189 Chicanos PorLa Causa,Inc., 558 F.3d at 861.
'9 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
191 United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009).
192 Id. at 131-32.
19'
194

Id. at 132.
id

Id. at 134.
196 Brief for Respondents, Bond v. United States, No. 09-1227 (petition for cert. granted
'9

Oct. 12, 2010).
'9 130 S. Ct. 1878 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
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ceding the child's birth.' 9 8 If it is the mother who is the American
citizen, this time period only has to be one year.199 If it is the father,
it has to be "at least five years after [the father's] fourteenth birthday." 200 The question is whether the federal law violates equal protection. 20 1 The Court is most likely going to find it unconstitutional,
because it clearly treats men and women differently without a rational
reason to do so.
In 1973, then lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an amicus
brief in Frontierov. Richardson202 urging the Supreme Court to use
strict scrutiny as the standard for gender discrimination.2 0 3 There
were four votes in support of a strict scrutiny standard, but she was
unable to get the fifth vote.20 4 In 1976, the Supreme Court created a
new standard of review called intermediate scrutiny, which said that
gender classifications should be allowed if they are substantially related to an important government purpose.2 0 5
An important change occurred in the mid-1990s when women's rights organizations split among themselves.20 6 Some women's
rights organizations continued to argue for strict scrutiny, but some
women's rights organizations began to accept the intermediate scrutiny standard.20 7 The last case to address this issue was United States
v. Virginia.20 8 The case involved Virginia Military Institute's policy
of refusing to accept women. 209 The Supreme Court held in a seven
19 United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008).
199 Id. at 995.
200 id.

201 Id. at 993.

411 U.S. 677 (1973).
203Edward McGlynn Gafffiey, Jr., Curious Chiasma: Rising and Falling Protection of
Religious Freedom and Gender Equality, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 394, 431 (2002).
204 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing that the challenged
statute unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of gender, but refusing to agree that
such classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
205 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
206 See Brief for Petitioner at 36, Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (No. 94-1941),
1995 WL
703403 ("[T]his court should now hold that such classifications are inherently suspect and
subject to strict judicial scrutiny."); Brief for Women's Schools Together, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL
761812 (supporting intermediate scrutiny).
207 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 206; Brief for Women's Schools Together, Inc.,
supra note 206.
208 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
209 Id. at 523.
202
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to one decision that the policy was unconstitutional.2 1 0
Another case on the Court's 2010 docket is Ashcroft v. al21
Kidd. ' Abdullah al-Kidd was apprehended by federal authorities
and detained under the federal material witness statute.2 12 He was
detained for sixteen days, and after his release, he was confined to his
213
testimony was never used in a prosecution. 214
home.2 13 However, his
Instead, what he alleges is that the material witness statute was used
to detain him for purposes of investigation. 215 The material witness
statute allows the government to hold somebody as a material witness
if his or her testimony is likely to be essential, and he or she is likely
to be unavailable unless detained.2 16
Abdullah al-Kidd may be a representative of thousands of
others who are held in this way. He sued the Attorney General of the
United States, John Ashcroft, saying that John Ashcroft violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.2 17 The Fourth Amendment allows a person to be detained by the government only if there is probable cause
that he has committed a crime. 2 18 The strong opinion written by
Judge Milan Smith, a conservative judge appointed by George W.
Bush, said that probable cause is required to be shown to detain individuals under the material witness statute when the statute is "not being used for its stated purpose," which was the case here.2 19 Since
the government did not have probable cause to detain al-Kidd, the
Ninth Circuit held his detainment to be unconstitutional and rejected
any claims of immunity. 220 Attorney General Ashcroft has now
sought Supreme Court review and claims that as Attorney General,
he has absolute immunity.22 1
The Court will also consider Staub v. Proctor Hospital,22 2
20

Id at 557.

211
212

131 S. Ct. 415 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).

213 Id. at 953.
214 Id at 963.
215 Id at 954.
216 id
217

al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 957.

218 Id at 965.
219
220

Id. at 970.
id

Brief for Petitioner, al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, No. 10-98 (petition for cert. granted Oct. 18,
2010).
222 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
221
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which involves an angiography technologist who was fired due to alleged insubordination problems. 223 The number two person in the office, as opposed to the top person who actually engaged in the firing,
made a number of deprecating statements about the person based on
how much work he was missing because of his reservist military service.2 24 Staub sued alleging that he was fired because of his military
service.2 25 The issue is whether the statements of the number two
person in command can be imputed to the number one person who
never made such statements.22 6
There are also two Confrontation Clause cases in which the
Court granted plenary review this Term which will have a great impact on evidence law. One of the biggest changes in evidence law up
until this Term occurred when the Supreme Court held that prosecutors cannot use testimonial statements from unavailable witnesses
227
The
even if they are reliable, based on Crawford v. Washington.
key question that still remains is: What is considered testimonial? In
Crawford, Justice Scalia's opinion said the Court was not going to attempt a definition.22 8 The only case to define it since Crawfordcame
a couple of years later in Davis v. Washington.2 29 The case was actually two cases that came together when the Court decided the label. 230 The Supreme Court said if it is an emergency and an individual is describing ongoing events, then it is not testimonial. 2 3'
Therefore, the prosecutor can use the statements even if the witness is
not available and there is no opportunity for cross-examination.2 3 2
However, if the witness is describing past events and it is not an
emergency, then it is testimonial and the prosecutor cannot use the
statements.233
A similar issue was raised in a 2008 case known as Giles v.
223
224
225
226

Staub, 560 F.3d 647, 650-51 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 655.
id
id

541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
Id. at 68.
229 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
230 Id. at 817, 819.
231 Id. at 822.
232 See id at 821 (stating that only testimonial statements "cause the declarant to be a
'witness' within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause" and therefore limited by the
clause's requirements).
233 Id. at 822.
227
228
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California.23 4
Giles was prosecuted for the murder of his
235
The week before the murder, Giles's girlfriend made
girlfriend.
statements to police describing a domestic-violence incident in which
Giles threatened to kill her if she cheated on him.2 36 The issue in the
case was whether the girlfriend's testimonial statements could be
used as evidence, since her unavailability was due to the defendant's
own actions.2 37 She could not testify because she was deceased. The
Supreme Court rejected the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception in situations where the actions were not designed to
prevent the victim from testifying, and therefore her statements were
inadmissible. 238 The dissent objected in terms of the functional consequences in a domestic violence context, like that which existed in
the case.23 9 Yet, the majority did not entertain this idea.2 40
The first Confrontation Clause case on the Court's docket is
Michigan v. Bryant.24 1 Bryant was shot and gravely wounded. 242
Five officers found him lying on the ground six blocks from his
home.24 3 An officer asked him what happened, and the victim described who shot him. 24 Several hours later, the victim died in the
hospital. 245 The prosecutor wanted to use the victim's statements as
246
tesaeet
r
Even if the statements are
evidence in the criminal prosecution.
held to be testimonial, since there was never a chance for crossexamination, they are inadmissible.2 4 7 The Michigan Supreme Court
ruled four-to-three that the statements are testimonial and cannot be
used.248 The dissent took the opposite position and found it to be objectively reasonable to conceive that the officers' questions were directed at "addressing an ongoing emergency[,]" which would make
234
235
236

237

554 U.S. 353 (2008).
Id. at 356.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 355.

238 Id. at 377.
239

Giles, 554 U.S. at 406.

240 See id. at 376.
241
242

130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
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Id at 68.
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Id. at 66-67.
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the statements non-testimonial.24 9 It will be interesting to see how
the Court addresses the case because it falls between the extreme examples created by Davis and Crawford.2 50 Unlike Davis, the victim
was not confronting an immediate threat when making the statements.2 51 However, it also does not closely resemble the nontestimonial statements made hours later in a police station in Crawford.252 In this case, the shooting had just occurred, the location of
the shooter was still unknown, and the safety of both the police and
the victim were still uncertain. 25 3 The case demonstrates the difficulty courts have in making testimonial distinctions where the facts of
the case pose a "close question." 2 54
The second Confrontation Clause case is a follow-up to the
Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.2 5 5 In
Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court held that when the prosecutor
seeks to introduce a laboratory report into evidence, the prosecutor
must put the laboratory analyst on the stand and make the laboratory
analyst available for cross-examination by the defense.2 56 Justice
Kennedy in his dissent said that there is going to be prosecutions that
cannot go forward because the analyst is not available.25 7 Justice
Scalia's response to this argument was that this is what the Sixth
Amendment requires.258 Bullcoming v. New Mexico 2 5 9 raises the issue of whether "the prosecution [can] introduce testimonial statements of a non-testifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe
the laboratory analysis." 260 Hopefully, the Court's opinion in Bullcoming, in addition to the other cases on the 2010 Term docket, will
help give answers to these issues and the other unresolved issues confronting the Court this Term.
Id at 79 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
Id at 82.
251 id
252 Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at
80.
253 Id at 82.
254 id
255 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
256 Id. at 2532.
257 Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 2540 (majority opinion).
259 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
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